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*Cov. L.J. 1  Introduction 
Commenting on the synonym of possession, Pollock and Maitland once wrote that ‘in the 
history of our law there is no idea more cardinal than that of seisin. Even in the law of the 
present day it plays a part which must be studied by every lawyer; but in the past it was so 
important that the whole system of our land law was law about seisin and its 
consequences.’1 Almost a century later, the words of Pollock and Maitland cannot be taken 
lightly in the study of modern property law. It is almost impossible to understand the 
modern law of ownership and title without understanding the nature and significance of 
possession. Holmes attributed possession as a ‘conception which is only less important 
than contract.’2 In the case of personal property, many of the proprietary interests that are 
capable of existing in chattels depend solely on the notion of possession. For example, the 
special property of bailees in general,3 and that of pledgees is dependent on it. Today, 
possession and ownership usually go hand in hand since possession is one of the 
fundamental incidents of ownership. In the early law the courts were not concerned with 
abstract notions of title and ownership, instead, possession or seisin was indicative of 
whether a person should remain as owner or should lose his ownership to another who had 
exercised better possession of that thing. The purpose of this article is to explore how the 
concept of possession has played an important role in the common law tradition and 
whether that importance has remained with the same degree of force in the twenty-first 
Century, particularly in light of recent land law legislation and the human rights 
perspective. 
The Legal Idea of Possession 
To mankind possession of things is an important aspect of life. Without any possession of 
things in the world it is questionable whether a person has any liberty or security.4 It is for 
this reason that Salmond wrote, ‘possession is the most basic relationship between men 
and things.’5 It is also for this reason that early laws of *Cov. L.J. 2  property had one 
objective in mind, that is, the protection of lawful possession.6 Without such protection, 
not only would life be impracticable but also it would lead to a state of chaos and constant 
disorder. To the lay mind possession implies some form of control or detention of a thing. 
Sometimes the word possession is equated with ownership. Kocourek has described the 
nature of detention of a thing as involving the following elements:7 (i) a human being; (ii) 
a material thing or space which may be used by physical acting; (iii) with the requisite 
power for the act; (iv) by repeated acts; (v) with contact, or with such approximation of 
contact as to make the act immediately possible; (vi) without interference of others to 
prevent the act of use. The idea of possession as involving detention is taken by lawyers to 
suggest that, unlike ownership, which is essentially a de jure relationship between a person 
and a thing, possession is a de facto relationship between a person and a thing. This is no 
better explained than by Salmond who wrote, ‘whether a person has ownership depends on 
rules of law; whether a person has possession is a question that could be answered as a 
matter of fact and without reference to law at all.’8 Inherent in this idea is that the concept 
of possession exists before legal society and is therefore independent of, and, prior to the 
    Page2 
law. 
Possession in the early law: seisin 
In the early law, the concept of ownership and possession was not clearly divorced. This 
was evident from the fact that it was impossible to gain recognition of a right to possess 
which was good against the whole world or to vindicate any right to possess without 
reference to the concept of possession itself. In the early law possession was explained 
through the concept of ‘seisin’; a concept described as lying ‘at the root of the historical 
development of English land law.’9 The idea behind seisin lay in the actual or de facto 
possession of land which was determinate of whether a proprietary right in land was 
granted. There were no abstract ideas of title and right; instead possession decided 
whether a person had a right to land. As such seisin was not a question of right; but rather 
a question of fact, although fact might then lead to a right through the passage of time. 
Long sustained possession meant peace and order and seisin literally denoted quiet and 
peaceful enjoyment of land.10 From the Fifteenth Century onwards seisin became confined 
to persons who held an estate in freehold and seisin gave a presumption of ownership of 
land. A person who claimed land as a result of losing it to a wrongful possessor had to show 
his seisin, in other words his possession, in order to recover land back. However, given that 
seisin was a question of fact, even a person who wrongfully took possession of land could 
raise a presumption of ownership, which could only be defeated by a better showing of 
seisin in another person, that is the previous possessor pointing to a better seisin.11 
 *Cov. L.J. 3  The concept of seisin was not particular to land and it was used to protect 
property interests in chattels as well as land.12 However, it became to be employed 
predominantly in real property law and through the passage of time became to be 
understood as origin of title or right in land. Today the concept of seisin does not play the 
same degree of importance in real property law that it did in its early days. The means by 
which ownership in land is transferred to another no longer depends on mere delivery of 
seisin, or in the early language ‘livery of seisin’,13 but rather on a grant that does not 
require actual entry. The idea of actual possession reflecting seisin does, however, play a 
role in determining issues such as adverse possession of land. Although notions of 
ownership and title may have become more abstract, the English law of property has and 
to some extent will continue to recognize that ownership, even where based on clear legal 
ideas of right and title, is a relative concept. The idea of relativity of title and ownership 
holds that there is no such thing as absolute title to land and as such a claim to land, and 
for that matter other property such as chattels, depends on the non existence of a better 
claim to the same thing. 
The significance of possession in modern law 
The common law tradition regards ownership as a relative concept as opposed to an 
absolute one. This simply means that possession is a good title to a thing enforceable 
against anyone who cannot show a better title. Relativity of ownership, sometimes referred 
to as relativity of title, lies at the heart of property law in the common law tradition. 
Relativity of ownership originates from the force of possession in the common law. 
The very first principle of possession is that it raises a presumption of ownership. A person 
in actual possession of a thing is presumed to be the owner of it, albeit, that this 
presumption, like any presumption, can be rebutted. In lay language this may be 
summarized by saying that ‘ possession is nine-tenths the law’. However, there are sound 
legal justifications behind the presumption. Firstly, possession in fact is prima facie 
evidence of legal possession and that the possessor has all the legal remedies to protect 
such possession.14 Possession is said to be the root of title in that it is only through 
possession that ownership is born or the chain of title begun. Thus, an equally important 
principle operating here is that a person may be presumed to be the owner of a thing even 
when that person has no ownership in it, as, for example, where such a thing is found or 
taken without the authority of the true owner. Suppose that B finds a gold watch which in 
law belongs to A. If B takes possession, B's possession raises a presumption of ownership, 
which is good against the whole world except the true owner who has a better title to it. The 
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true owner can of course rebut the presumption of ownership, however, until such time, B 
will be deemed to have a possessory title to the gold watch. 
 *Cov. L.J. 4  The concept of possessory title now calls for discussion. A possessory title is 
one that is good against everyone except the true owner.15 Lord Campbell once explained 
the rule by commenting that ‘against a wrongdoer possession is title.’16 The origins for the 
rule of possessory title lie in the fact that English law never developed a sophisticated 
system of rules for the vindication of ownership rights. Instead, the right to ownership 
largely depended on the right to possession and it was possession that was accorded 
remedies. In the words of Pollock and Wright, ‘the common law never had any adequate 
process in the case of land, or any process at all in the case of goods, for the vindication of 
ownership pure and simple. So feeble and precarious was property without possession, or 
rather without possessory remedies, in the eyes of medieval lawyers, that possession 
largely usurped not only the substance but the name of property…’17 
It is important to appreciate that many of the remedies that seek to protect property 
interests in both land and chattels depend on possession rather than on absolute notions of 
ownership. Property interests in land and chattels are protected by what are known as 
property torts.18 In the case of land, an action for trespass to land requires that the 
claimant had possession or a right to immediate possession. In the normal course of things 
the possessor will be the owner, however, it is quite clear that a squatter will have sufficient 
standing to sue in trespass.19 This is because the squatter has possession in fact and law 
when he has control in fact and intends to control. In the case of chattels there are two torts 
that seek to protect property interests, namely trespass to goods and the tort of 
conversion.20 The success of both of these torts depends on whether the claimant has 
possession or an immediate right to possession. Trespass to goods is a wrongful physical 
interference with them. The tort of conversion amounts to a dealing with goods in a manner 
inconsistent with the right of the true owner.21 It is sometimes thought that, unlike 
trespass to goods, the tort of conversion is a truly proprietary remedy in that it protects 
ownership rather than mere possession. However, it is quite clear that a person in actual 
possession, such as a bailee of goods, can sue for conversion.22 What follows is that a 
person who has no possession or no immediate right to possession cannot sue for 
conversion. Thus, an owner who has no possession and neither an immediate right to 
possession cannot sue for conversion.23 Finally, where damage is caused to a chattel 
through the negligence *Cov. L.J. 5  of another person, the claimant must show that he 
either had ownership in the chattel or a possessory title.24 
Thus, possession plays an important role in the transfer and creation of property interests 
in personal property. Legal ownership generally cannot be transferred in a chattel until 
such time delivery of possession is made.25 In so far as possessory security interests in 
chattels are concerned, possession is all-important. Both a lien and a pledge require 
delivery of possession in order for the interests to be effective.26 
Possession and Original Acquisition of Property Rights 
The most basic way of acquiring a proprietary right such as that of ownership is by taking 
first possession of some object that has no owner. Most legal systems recognize that it is 
only through first occupation that a system of private property begins and the chain of 
ownership is created. It is for this reason that some of the early justifications for the 
existence of private property were based on first possession or occupation of a thing.27 In 
the case of many objects of property, although most notably land, the rule of first 
possession moves society away from common property and towards enforceable private 
property rights. However, given the fact that most resources over time will and do become 
parceled into private ownership, how important in contemporary property law is original 
acquisition as a means of acquiring property rights in external objects? The underlying 
assumption appears to be that such a mode of acquisition requires the existence of 
un-owned resources. Despite its primitive origins, original acquisition remains a significant 
means by which the right of ownership can be acquired. What has in fact changed is the 
conditions under which original acquisition rules operate. In primitive society such modes 
of acquisition operated to resolve disputes resulting from the scarcity value arising from 
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the claims of individuals to common property. Such rules had as their function the provision 
of a system of allocation of resources which in turn could attain peace and order.28 
In contemporary property law, original acquisition rules operate under quite different 
circumstances and also seek to meet different objectives. Justifications for original 
acquisition rules today are not necessarily to preserve peace and order; instead such rules 
seek to promote more specific legal, social and economic objectives. So what are the 
circumstances under which original acquisition rules operate? Firstly, there have been 
claims in modern law based on original acquisition that is sought to be recognized as 
binding on the radical title acquired by the Crown through colonization. For example, in 
Mabo v. Queensland (No.2),29 the High Court of Australia had to consider whether the 
communal native title of the Meriam people to land on Murray Island was binding on the 
radical title acquired by the Crown on settlement. The case *Cov. L.J. 6  involved an 
action by a number of Murray Islanders seeking declaratory remedies in relation to their 
native title to land on the Island, one of a group of three islands in the Torres Strait Region. 
The Islands did not form part of the British Dominions until their annexation to Queensland 
in 1879; however, the occupants of the Islands, the Meriam people, had occupied these 
lands for tens of thousands of years well before 1870. The question was whether the 
Meriam People were vested with a communal title which burdened the radical title of the 
Crown on settlement. The matter fell to be determined by reference to the prevailing 
common law at around 1870. The High Court of Australia ruled that the Meriam people had 
acquired a communal title to land by reason of their possession and occupation of the land 
and as such was binding on the whole world except for those portions which had been 
surrendered to the Crown. 
More frequently, however, are the claims to objects that have been lost or abandoned and 
here the law is equally problematic. A person who finds and takes control of a lost or 
abandoned object can enforce his right of ownership to it against everyone except the true 
owner. Moreover, he can also defeat the rights of the true owner and obtain a fully blooded 
ownership right to the object in question. Two of the most obvious examples of original 
acquisition are claims to lost and abandoned objects and claims to land through the 
principles of adverse possession and it is the claim to land through adverse possession 
which will be considered next. 
Adverse Possession of Land 
The basic idea behind adverse possession of land is that a person who takes possession of 
land, albeit wrongfully to begin with, acquires a possessory title to the land which, after the 
expiration of twelve years, is good against the whole world. The title of the paper owner is 
simply extinguished through lapse of time. It is often difficult to understand how wrongful 
possession of land can give birth to a full-blooded ownership right against the whole world. 
This is especially so in a context where ownership rights are dependent on the existence of 
elaborate title deeds and a system of registration of such rights.30 However, once again we 
see that, even in the face of title deeds to land and registration of such ownership rights, 
possession retains an all-important function in deciding the relative strength of ownership. 
In this respect, leading conveyancers openly admit that ‘…misunderstanding have 
sometimes arisen from an unwarrantable belief that title deeds are sacrosanct documents, 
whereas the truth is that neither a conveyance nor a land certificate retains its value if the 
landowner is so indifferent as to lose physical control of his land.’31 
The basic rules relating to acquisition of ownership in land through adverse possession are 
found in the Limitation Act 1980 and the relevant case law.32 The Limitation Act 1980 
contains three important statutory principles relating to adverse possession. First, no 
action can be brought by a landowner to recover his land after *Cov. L.J. 7  the expiration 
of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued to him.33 Secondly, the 
right of action to recover land is deemed to have accrued to the landowner when the 
landowner has either been dispossessed of his land or has discontinued use of his land.34 
Finally, no right of action is deemed to have accrued unless the land is in possession of 
some person in whose favour the limitation period can run and where any such right of 
action is deemed to have accrued on a certain date and no person is in adverse possession 
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on that date, the right of action is not deemed to have accrued unless and until the land is 
again taken in adverse possession.35 These statutory principles can be explained in the 
following way. Whilst it is clear that no action to recover land after twelve years from the 
date upon which the right of action accrued to the landowner is allowed, time does not 
simply run because the land is unoccupied.36 Time only begins to run when the landowner 
has been dispossessed of his land or where he has discontinued use of his land and the 
adverse possessor has taken possession of the land for the limitation period. If there is any 
break in the adverse possession, for example, where A takes adverse possession from B, 
but B recovers his land within, lets say, six years, time stops running. Any new claim based 
on adverse possession cannot rely on A's six years of adverse possession. However, the Act 
allows the limitation period to be built up by a series of adverse possessions by different 
possessors proving that at no time during the aggregate period of twelve years there has 
been a break in the adverse possession. The effect of a successful claim to adverse 
possession is that the paper owner's title is completely extinguished. In the case of a 
registered title to land, until such time as the squatter is registered as the new proprietor 
of the land, the existing registered proprietor holds the land on a statutory trust for the 
squatter.37 
Adverse Possession in the House of Lords and the Importance of 
Possession Reaffirmed 
In addition to the statutory requirements needed for a successful claim to ownership to 
land by adverse possession, there are a number of common law requirements, which were 
examined in depth by the Court of Appeal in Buckingham County Council v. Moran,38 and 
more recently by the House of Lords in JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. Graham.39 The decision of 
the House of Lords confirms the supremacy of single and exclusive possession as the basis 
of a successful claim to ownership of land through adverse possession. 
The facts of the case were as follows. The personal representative of the late Michael 
Graham along with Caroline Graham (hereafter, the Grahams) claimed rights to 25 
hectares of agricultural land belonging to JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd (Pye). They based their 
argument on s.15 of the Limitation Act 1980, which provides that no action shall be brought 
by a landowner to recover his land after the expiration of twelve years from the date on 
which the right of action accrued to him. Schedule 1, paragraph 1 provides that the right of 
action to recover land is deemed to have accrued to the *Cov. L.J. 8  landowner when the 
land owner has been either dispossessed of his land or has discontinued use of his land. 
Dispossession usually refers to an ouster by the squatter, for example, where the squatter 
has fenced in land belonging to the paper owner and has since then not allowed the paper 
owner to enter on the land. The Grahams argued that since 1984 they had taken 
possession of the land belonging to Pye and as a result they had established a successful 
claim of adverse possession. Pye counter-argued that the land had at all time belonged to 
them and that they had an intention to build on the land. More importantly, however, they 
argued that the Grahams had at no time dispossessed them of the land. This is because 
firstly, in 1983 the Grahams had entered into an agreement with Pye to use the land until 
31 December 1983 for the payment of a sum of £2000. Secondly, when that agreement 
expired the Grahams continued to use the land, their use of it was not inconsistent with the 
paper title of Pye because they were willing to pay for the use of land and as such were not 
acting as owners of it. After 1986 Pye did very little in so far as the disputed land. Pye 
brought proceedings to recover the land in 1998. 
At first instance the judge held that the Grahams had established a successful possessory 
title to Pye's land and that time began to run against Pye since 1984 after the expiration of 
the licence agreement. The Court of Appeal reversed this finding and held that no 
successful adverse possession claim could be found simply because the Grahams had not 
dispossessed Pye from the land. One of the main arguments in the case was that, even 
though Pye had done very little in the period between 1986 and 1998, they were still within 
the limitation period to claim the land back. In so far as the period between 1984 and 1986, 
the Court of Appeal held that there could be no finding of dispossession simply because the 
Grahams were using the land in the hope that a new licence agreement might be 
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forthcoming. This subjective intention was held to be crucial by the Court of Appeal 
because it was indicative of a form of implied licence by Pye that the Grahams could use the 
land. The decision of the Court of Appeal begged the question whether a successful claim to 
adverse possession rested on the subjective intentions of both the squatter and the paper 
owner or rather on the objective intention to possess land for the requisite period of time 
required by the Limitation Act 1980? Furthermore, were subjective factors such as the 
willingness of the squatter to pay for the use of land and his subjective belief that he was 
not the owner relevant? 
The decision of the House of Lords in J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. Graham has not only 
reaffirmed the importance of possession in the common law tradition as had been 
understood historically, but it has also explained that it is long-sustained possession that is 
the root of a successful claim to adverse possession. It does not matter that the adverse 
possessor does not have an actual subjective belief that he is acting as the owner.40 
Neither does it matter that the possessor is willing to pay for the occupation of the land, 
providing that there is possession which is inconsistent with the paper owner's title.41 
Much of the confusion in J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. Graham arose from the decision of 
Bramwell LJ in Leigh v. Jack,42 where his Lordship explained that possession of the paper 
owner could not be disturbed by a squatter if the paper owner could show a future intention 
to use the land. This so-called ‘implied licence theory’ meant that the squatter's 
possession, no matter how strong and continuous, could not *Cov. L.J. 9  disturb the 
paper owner's title. However, this rule had been rejected by the Court of Appeal in 
Buckingham County Council v. Moran.43 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained that the matter was simply one of whether the adverse 
possessor had dispossessed the paper owner by going into ordinary possession of the land 
without his consent. In so far as the requisite acts needed for possession, his Lordship 
explained that this required two elements. Firstly, a sufficient degree of physical custody 
and control, this requires factual possession. Secondly, an intention to exercise such 
custody and control for his own benefit. In so far as a need to have an intention to own, his 
Lordship referred to the words of Slade LJ in Buckingham County Council v. Moran, where 
he stated that what was required was ‘not an intention to own or even an intention to 
acquire ownership, but an intention to possess.’44 On the basis of these principles, Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson explained that the Grahams had established a satisfactory possessory 
title to the land belonging to Pye. Furthermore, their willingness to pay for the occupation 
of the land did not matter providing that they had the necessary possession at all times. 
Their willingness to pay did not alter the fact that they had the necessary factual 
possession for the period of time prescribed by the Limitation Act 1980. 
Adverse Possession and Human Rights 
In the post-Human Rights Act era the question has arisen whether the deprivation of 
ownership of land through the principles of adverse possession is in violation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Put quite simply, is the cumulative effect of the 
Limitation Act 1980 in respect of claims for the recovery of land and the consequential 
denial of the right to claim land after twelve years a deprivation of a person's property 
contrary to Article 1, Protocol 1 of the Convention? Section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 
1998 imposes a duty on a domestic court to, wherever possible, read and give effect to 
primary and subordinate legislation in a manner which is compatible with the Convention. 
Article 1, Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides: 
‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No 
one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided by law and by the general principles of international law.’ 
The loss of ownership through adverse possession falls quite neatly into the second rule of 
Article 1, Protocol 1. In the words of one leading commentator, ‘that an owner can be 
effectively deprived of his or her land without the payment of compensation and without 
due legal process raises the question as to the compatibility of s.15 of the Limitation Act 
1980 with Article 1, Protocol 1.45 If it is incompatible, then the impact of possession as a 
means of extinguishing a former title in land and creating a new one as discussed in this 
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article is reduced to a meaningless concept. 
The question of whether s.15 of the Limitation Act 1980 and the consequential denial of 
ownership through adverse possession is so incompatible was considered by the *Cov. 
L.J. 10  High Court and the Court of Appeal in J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. Graham.46 In the 
High Court Neuberger J, although coming to the conclusion that the Grahams has 
established a successful claim to adverse possession of land, was nevertheless sympathetic 
to the human rights arguments presented on behalf of Pye. In the course of his judgment, 
his Lordship commented that ‘the result is disproportionate, because, particularly in a 
climate of increasing awareness of human rights, including the right to enjoy one's own 
property, it does seem draconian to the owner, and a windfall for the squatter, that the 
owner should lose 57 acres of land to the squatter with no compensation whatsoever.’47 
The Court of Appeal, however, took a rather different approach to the compatibility of the 
Limitation Act 1980 with the protection of property guaranteed in the Convention. 
Mummery LJ was of the opinion that the Limitation Act 1980, in particular s.15, which 
provides that no right of action to recover land shall be bought after twelve years after the 
right of action accrued to the legal owner, was not incompatible with the protection 
afforded in Article 1, Protocol 1. His Lordship explained that the effect of s.15 was not to 
deprive the legal owner of land, his possessions or peaceful enjoyment of them, rather the 
effect of the Act was to deprive him of his right to access the courts for the purpose of 
recovering property if he has delayed the institution of legal proceedings for 12 years or 
more…’48 
It is not altogether clear whether the distinction between a deprivation of property and a 
deprivation of a right to bring an action for the recovery of property is a satisfactory one in 
the context of property rights. One of the crucial incidents of a person's ownership of a 
thing is the right to be put in possession of a thing and remain in possession if he so 
chooses.49 An equally important incident of ownership is the right to security, which 
involves an expectation on behalf of the owner that he will remain owner indefinitely if he 
so chooses. This expectation amounts to immunity from expropriation except where just 
compensation is given to the legal owner. In this respect, the right to commence an action 
for the recovery of property is a central ingredient of a person's ownership. The deprivation 
of a person's right to commence an action to recover his property is a deprivation of one of 
the very basic ingredients of his ownership. The matter is explained by one commentator 
who writes, …‘is the ability to commence court proceedings to recover property from a 
trespasser a fundamental characteristic of property ownership? If it is, the loss of the right 
to commence court action impinges upon the very nature of property ownership and 
cannot be artificially dissected from it and treated as separate from it.’50 
Most land lawyers expect that the human rights impact of adverse possession will in time 
reach Strasbourg and the European Court will have to decide whether s.15 of the Limitation 
Act is in violation of the Article 1, Protocol 1. In the meantime, the interference of property 
may be justified in the public interest. In Mummery LJ's opinion the provisions of the 
Limitation Act 1980 are ‘…provided for by law and are in the public interest within the 
meaning of Article 1. Such conditions are reasonably *Cov. L.J. 11  required to avoid the 
real risk of injustice in the adjudication of stale claims, to ensure certainty of title and to 
promote social stability by the protection of the established and peaceful possession of 
property from the resurrection of old claims.’51 
Adverse Possession and the Land Registration Act 2002 
The Land Registration Act 2002 will put to an end the supremacy of single and exclusive 
possession as the basis for a successful claim to ownership of land through the principles of 
adverse possession.52 The reforms in the Act have been described as ‘even more 
far-reaching than the great reforms of property law that were made by the 1925 property 
legislation.’53 The basic idea behind the rules of adverse possession in the new Act is that 
mere possession of land for the requisite limitation period will not in itself extinguish the 
title of the legal owner and give a new title to the squatter. The reason for this lies in the 
fact that the fundamental objective of the Act is to introduce a system of electronic 
conveyancing. The objective of on-line conveyancing requires a register of land titles which 
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is complete and accurate at any give time. The idea that long undisturbed possession can 
defeat a registered owner's title does not fit neatly into a system of registration of title that 
requires a true and accurate reflection of the ownership of land. 
Under the Land Registration Act 2002, there is no concept of automatic extinguishment of 
a registered owner's title.54 Instead, after ten years of adverse possession, a squatter will 
be entitled to apply for registration as the proprietor of the land. Once the squatter makes 
this application, the registered proprietor is informed of the application and is entitled to 
object to it. If the registered proprietor objects within two years from the date on which the 
application is made then normally that is the end of the matter provided that the registered 
proprietor takes the necessary steps to evict the squatter from the land. There are only 
three circumstances in which a squatter will be entitled to be registered as proprietor of the 
estate after the ten-year period.55 The first is where it would be unconscionable for the 
registered proprietor to dispossess the squatter. The most obvious case here would be 
when there is an estoppel working in favour of the squatter. The second is where the 
applicant is for some other reason entitled to be registered as the proprietor of the land. An 
example of this second situation is when the squatter is entitled to the land by reason of a 
contract for sale of land and has paid the purchase price, but has not yet had a formal 
conveyance of the legal title to him. Finally, where the dispute is one relating to a 
boundary. 
There is no doubt that the Land Registration Act 2002 significantly reduces the impact of 
possession of land as a means by which ownership can be acquired. Once commentator 
describes this development as one that has both a moral and legal justification.56 The 
moral justification relates to the fact that it is objectionable that a *Cov. L.J. 12  squatter 
can acquire a title to land by mere factual possession of the land with the necessary 
intention to control the land. The legal justification relates to the fact that in a system of 
registration of title to land, title is acquired by the act of registration and not by possession 
of land. 
Conclusions 
It is questionable whether in the twenty first century the concept of possession has 
survived the significance it once occupied in the early law. Despite the importance of 
possession and its significance being re-affirmed by the House of Lords in the J A Pye 
(Oxford) Ltd v. Graham, in the context of land there are number of factors which have 
contributed to its demise. Firstly, the Land Registration Act 2002, which aims to create an 
accurate and complete register of land titles, does not and cannot accommodate for a 
system of rules which automatically defeat the title of the registered proprietor by long 
sustained possession of land. The objective of the Land Registration Act 2002 is to make 
title to land absolute. In this respect, the concept of adverse possession, which was 
justified in the context of unregistered titles to land relying on long sustained possession of 
the land, does not fit into a system of land registration where ownership is acquired by the 
act of registration and not possession. There are a number of consequences flowing from 
this development for English land lawyers. It is questionable how meaningful it is now for 
students of land law to engage into discourse relating to relativity of title and to distinguish 
the common law notions of ownership from Roman law notions of ownership. The very 
objective of making land titles indefeasible has the effect of moving the concept of 
ownership in English Law towards the absolute concept of ownership recognized in Roman 
law.57 Furthermore, the very idea of property in land as seen to be based, inter alia, on 
fact, as explained by leading land lawyers, seems difficult to justify in this twenty-first 
Century of indefeasibility of land title. For example, how far is it possible to reconcile the 
following words of Kevin Gray and Susan Gray with the reforms made in the Land 
Registration Act 2002: ‘…there is a deeply anti-intellectual streak in the common law 
tradition which cares little for grand or abstract theories of ownership, preferring to fasten 
on the raw organic facts of human behaviour…Accordingly, the crude empiricism of this 
outlook leaves the recognition of property to rest upon essentially intuitive perceptions of 
the degree to which a claimant successfully asserts de facto possessory control over 
land.’58 
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The second factor that may further impact on the significance of possession is the human 
rights one. Although, the Court of Appeal in J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. Graham has taken the 
view that the concept of long sustained possession giving rise to adverse possession of land 
is not in violation of Article 1, Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, it is 
only a matter of time when the matter will have to be decided in Europe or under the 
Human Rights Act. However, having said this, given the reforms made by the Land 
Registration Act 2002 in respect of adverse possession, it is unlikely that the deprivation of 
ownership in circumstances where the *Cov. L.J. 13  owner of the land it given the 
opportunity to object to the adverse possession will be seen as violating the provision of 
Article1, Protocol 1. 
 Senior Lecturer in Law, Coventry University. 
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